Will the EU Get Its Security Union Right This Time?

In the wake of the Brussels terrorist attack of 2016, the Juncker Commission made considerable efforts towards an effective and genuine Security Union. This article assesses the outline of the Security Union as envisioned by the Juncker Commission. It then examines the fundamental changes that emerged with the inauguration of the von der Leyen Commission, followed by a critical analysis of the reasons behind.

The Security Union under the Juncker Commission

The years 2015 and 2016 saw some of the most gruesome terrorist attacks taking place on the European soil. The most devastating was the killing of 130 people at six locations in central Paris on 13-14 November 2015 and the murder of 32 people at two locations in Brussels on 22 March 2016. These were part of a long-going series of attacks carried out by or claimed to be the responsibility of Islamic extremist terrorist groups that emerged since the early 2000s. In 2015 and 2016 alone, there were 30 separate incidences of attacks claiming at least 185 lives in Europe.

Unlike other terrorist events in the past, the recent attacks, especially those in Paris and Brussels, were particularly alarming to the EU member states and citizens for four principal reasons. First, the terrorists targeted facilities and lives at the heart of Europe itself. Second, the devastating aftermath of the attacks as well as the shaking of the public trust manifested the weakness of intelligence cooperation between European countries. Third, there was a stark realisation that the attackers could be European residents and citizens, not complete foreigners entering Europe immediately before their acts of terrorism. Lastly, the timing of these terrorist attacks coincided with the refugee crisis, which further fuelled public fear among the Europeans (Mortera-Martinez, 2019).

Within a few weeks of the Brussels attacks, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, remarked, “The time for action has come. In the area of security, as in many other areas in Europe, fragmentation is what makes us vulnerable. Europe needs a genuine security union” (European Commission, 2016). Proposing to close gaps in European security policies, Juncker appointed Britain’s Julian King as the Commissioner solely responsible for the new Security Union project. Building upon the existing European Agenda on Security, the Security Union seeks to introduce institutional coherence at both national and EU levels.

In particular, the Security Union aims to prevent radicalisation, strengthen border management, improve information exchange and operational cooperation, cut the access of terrorists to financing, protect Europeans against firearms and explosives, promote the security research and innovation dimension, and develop the external aspect. As a new commissioner, Julian King was tasked to stocktake vulnerabilities of the European security policies and advance a coherent policy framework in close cooperation with other relevant commissioners (Mortera-Martinez, 2019).

During his term from 2016 to 2019, King was able to make several achievements in the Security Union. The EU has been able to link a range of security databases and make that information widely accessible to security-related agencies throughout Europe. The EU has signed deals with many African countries to curb irregular migration. The EU has improved its ability to track and monitor suspicious individuals, effectively making it difficult for terrorists to access weapons and money. Overall, the EU has achieved significant progress in border controls and counter-terrorism. EU actions on security and migration have become much more effective and accountable (Mortera-Martinez, 2019). As shown in Table 1, the Juncker European Commission was able to get 16 of the 22 Security Union initiatives agreed by the European Parliament and the Council. Hence, continuity is imperative in the next Commission to ensure that the previously adopted initiatives are adequately implemented, and the remaining six proposals obtain agreement by the institutions.

Table 1. Agreed and Pending Security Union Initiatives as of October 2019
(Own representation with information from European Commission (2019))

Changes in the von der Leyen Commission

However, when the von der Leyen Commission assumed office in December 2019, three indications of derogations in the Security Union are observed. First, while the von der Leyen Commission differs from the Juncker Commission on several fronts, the most obvious is its lack of a commissioner solely in charge of the Security Union. In the Juncker Commission, Julian King was explicitly given the responsibility to oversee the design and implementation of the Security Union. As shown in Figure 1, King was mandated to carry out a specific set of critical tasks in close cooperation with many other commissioners as well as the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship. Acting almost like a Vice-President, he was supported by a task force comprising experts from various directorates-general and reported directly to the First Vice-President.

Figure 1. Commissioner in charge of the Security Union in the Juncker Commission
(Own representation with information from Juncker (2016))

On the other hand, as Figure 2 shows, the von der Leyen Commission seemingly downgraded the Security Union agenda as one of the many tasks supervised by Margaritis Schinas, the Vice-President for Promoting our European Way of Life. A considerable portion of security-related tasks is also to be performed by Ylva Johansson, the Commissioner for Home Affairs, but her responsibility also covers migration issues. This means that leadership behind the Security Union project is not as focused as before. Also, the Security Union is now given relatively low priority, perhaps lower than migration and von der Leyen’s ambitious Defence Union (Evans, 2019) (Von der Burchard & Herszenhorn, 2019).

Figure 2. Commissioners in charge of the Security Union in the von der Leyen Commission
(Own representation with information from Von der Leyen (2019b and 2019c))

Second, the Security Union is not included in von der Leyen’s priority list. Her political guidelines include six policy areas: A European Green Deal, An economy that works for people, A Europe fit for the digital age, Protecting our European way of life, A stronger Europe in the world, and A new push for European democracy. As per the commission structure, the Security Union would come under ‘Protecting our European way of life’ which is subdivided into ‘upholding the rule of law’, ‘strong borders and a fresh start on migration’, and ‘internal security’. Elements of the Security Union are hinted in this part of von der Leyen’s priority list, with some of the nuances smearing into the ‘A stronger Europe in the world’ section. Nevertheless, the Security Union, both the term itself and the notion of bringing the member states’ security-related actions in coherence at the EU level, is not explicitly indicated anywhere in her agenda (Von der Leyen, 2019a).

Third, the von der Leyen Commission has not made any visible progress on the Security Union to date. During its first 100 days, the Commission started to address most of its priority policy areas, including the European Green Deal, just transition to digital future, a fair minimum wage, free trade agreement negotiation with the United Kingdom, and gender equality, but not the Security Union (European Commission, n.d.). The Commission’s Adjusted Work Programme for 2020 also indicates that no significant progress has been made for a new Security Union strategy. The Commission initially planned to adopt the strategy during Q2 2020, but it has now been postponed to Q3 2020 (European Commission, 2020).

Discussion

The von der Leyen Commission’s apparent lack of enthusiasm in the Security Union can be explained with three reasons. First, the departure of the United Kingdom from the EU has had a devastating effect on the Security Union. Julian King, the British Commissioner in charge of the Security Union, was undoubtedly an indispensable asset to the EU in forging the Security Union during the three years he was in office. However, more crucial is the fact that Britain is one of the world’s intelligence and military superpowers. Aside from France, Britain is the only nuclear power in Europe, it has a vast intelligence network, and it has shown willingness to back its soft power with hard power. Britain can weaponise sanctions policy effectively, and it has the infrastructure to support all of the above. Brexit, without any effective UK-EU security cooperation deals in place, will leave the EU in want (Patrick, 2020).

Second, Euroscepticism and populism have grappled European politics at both national and EU levels. Following the recent terrorist attacks and refugee crisis, more Europeans have become apprehensive of people from other continents. As a result, there are increased demands for stricter border controls and tracking of potential terrorists. While this has some reinforcing effect on the Security Union, the Eurosceptic and nationalistic perspectives prevent the necessary competences from being conferred to the EU institutions. The expansion of the far-right and Eurosceptic political groups in the European Parliament also means that the European Commission will have a hard time getting many of its initiatives adopted by the Parliament, especially on politically sensitive issues.

Third, as a result of the two reasons above, the von der Leyen Commission is hindered from embarking on the genuinely ambitious European agenda. The current political climate only allows the Commission to address politically neutral issues such as climate change, economic recovery and social reform. Cross-sectoral, inter-institutional reforms, such as the Security Union, are pushed aside (Pietz, 2019). Von der Leyen has been criticised for downgrading the Security Union and placing it under the vaguely named policy category called ‘Protecting European Way of Life’. The critics condemn the Commission for being too concerned with keeping its external borders shut, effectively treating legal migrants as potential enemies (Evans, 2019) (Von der Burchard & Herszenhorn, 2019).

Conclusion

As we have seen, significant progress was made in the Security Union project during the three years of Julian King’s leadership. However, the von der Leyen Commission made organisational changes and the Security Union tasks became dispersed among several commissioners. We argued that the new Commission gave the Security Union lower priority, mainly because of the loss of Britain from EU membership and the rise of Euroscepticism and populism. Nonetheless, the reality may not be as bleak as it seems. Despite Brexit, UK-EU negotiations are still ongoing, and the scope and nature of security and intelligence cooperation between the two parties are yet to be determined. The von der Leyen Commission’s organisational structure concerning the Security Union could also prove to be an innovation in the end. The Security Union is one of the critical areas supervised by a Vice-President, and the Commissioner in charge of internal security is well-posed to meet the challenges (Johansson, 2020). Perhaps most importantly, the corona crisis may offer a much-needed opportunity for the EU for transnational, interinstitutional reforms. Very much like terrorism, the pandemic has emerged as a shared threat to Europeans, necessitating concerted, coordinated actions between member states and EU institutions, the very reason why the EU needs an effective, genuine Security Union today.

References

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