Various European integration models attempt to explain how each Member State’s national interests are represented at the EU level. The EU is foremost an international organisation that has been established as a result of intergovernmental agreements. Naturally, each member state (MS) is a key actor in the scene; each MS’s interests influence what decisions are reached at the EU level. This initial assumption fits rather nicely with the (neo-) realist framework. However, the EU is continuously evolving. Moreover, it is not just an international organisation. As a sui generis establishment, it affects not only the MS but also their citizens. It serves as a venue for MS interaction as well as a global action. While the EU started more like a (neo-) realist structure and is generally heading in the direction of (neo-) functionalism/federalism, I find it incredibly difficult to describe the current snapshot of the EU with just one model. Each model has its distinct focal points, and most models have certain features that can hold only in exclusion of all other models.
Thus, I opt to explain the mechanism of national interest representation at the EU using a patchwork of several models, just as the EU is a patchwork of institutions. The diagram above illustrates my observation. At present, EU MS are neither realist nor federalist. They seek to maximise their interests, but not as in a war against each other over zero-sum gains. They are fully aware of socialisation’s significance at the EU level and the impact of collective EU actions. At the same time, we see that a United States of Europe is still far away, if visible on the horizon at all.
Here, I would like to use Liberal Intergovernmentalism to explain how national interests are contested, shaped and represented through the domestic setup, also known as Moravcsik’s black box. In this model, “governments are assumed to act purposively in the international arena, but based on goals that are defined domestically.” Various channels have been established to enable citizens to voice their opinions at the EU level, such as through direct EP elections and European citizens’ initiative. However, the nation-state still serves as the main window into the EU. Hence, we can say that certain aspects of realism still hold. I also find that the three dimensions of Liberal Intergovernmentalism—demand for cooperation from inside, supply from the inter-state level, and institutional delegation—explain the EU better than all other models.
Social Constructivism and Sociological Institutionalism explain how each MS’s interests are socialised at the EU level. When an MS brings its agenda to the EU scene, it naturally wants an outcome that best benefits itself. However, it is also aware that it cannot always have its way. The MS seeks to reinforce, legitimise, and find support for its agenda in collusion with other like-minded MS. When it encounters uncompromising opponents, it aspires to convince them otherwise or uses the EU framework to influence and coerce them. However, as has been evident in the European Council decision-making process during recent years, the critical method is seldom a full-scale confrontation but consensus-reaching through the logic of appropriateness.
The Europeanisation model then explains how socialisation results at the EU level influence the MS and their citizens. Following the direction of influence, this completes a full circle. National interests are formulated in the domestic arena, brought to the EU level to influence other MS and get influenced by them. Then the EU decisions and norms feedback to the national agenda-setting circle. In this patchwork of three models, the two outstanding features are that states are rational actors with a consensus-seeking tendency and that states approve the EU and EU decisions only as long as they reinforce their legitimacy and efficiency.
So, wherein the EU system do we see this principle of national interest representation institutionalised? The three models I used are not in total exclusion of one another, and they overlap heavily almost everywhere, contrary to the simplicity of my drawing. From the Liberal Intergovernmentalist point of view, the European Council is the most crucial arena of national interest representation and bargaining. Nevertheless, we should remember that fighting is not the only thing that happens in the Council; it is also an arena of cooperative balancing and integrative balancing. The MS influence each other. However, I want to stress that the entire EU construct from the Social Constructivist view—the norms, values, law, and institutions—is indispensable. It influences how MS interact, how the EU evolves, and how EU citizens take on the EU identity. In that regard, the most critical pieces of EU construct, which supersede even the European Council in importance, are Articles 2 and 3 of the TEU that lay down the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights as the foundation of the EU.
This leads us to the topic of Western democracy, also known as liberal democracy. As enshrined in the TEU, democracy is a crucial value of the EU. According to the Sociological Institutionalist view, the entire EU political system shows a consensus democracy, a form of liberal democracy. Democracy sets the stage for domestic determination of interests at the national level and democracy serves as the framework of inter-state bargaining, balancing and socialising at the EU level. Hence, the principle of liberal democracy and the principle of national interest representation are not opposing ideas; both describe how various actors interact at the national and EU levels.
Leave a comment